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Abstract
Subsidized reinsurance represents a potentially important tool to help stabilize individual health insurance
markets. This brief describes alternative forms of subsidized reinsurance and the mechanisms by which they
spread risk and reduce premiums. It summarizes specific state initiatives and Congressional proposals that
include subsidized reinsurance. It compares approaches to each other and to more direct subsidies of
individual market enrollment. For a given amount of funding, a particular program’s efficacy will depend on
how it affects insurers’ risk and the risk margins built into premiums, incentives for selecting or avoiding risks,
incentives for coordinating and managing care, and the costs and complexity of administration. These effects
warrant careful consideration by policymakers as they consider measures to achieve stability in the individual
market in the long term.
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The Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
fundamentally transformed individual health 
insurance markets and significantly expanded 
coverage. But markets in many states remain 
unstable, partly due to disproportionate 
enrollment by older and sicker enrollees. While 
ACA subsidies to households below 400% of 
poverty (Advance Premium Tax Credits, or 
APTCs) limit the impact of rising premiums 
on most current enrollees, unbalanced risk 
pools and resulting premiums discourage 
take up of coverage by many people eligible 
for little or no subsidy. Total individual market 
enrollment is much lower than projected when 
the ACA was passed, and it declined in 2017 
as premiums jumped and insurers withdrew in 
many states.1 
Federal and state officials are considering 
stabilizing the individual market through some 
type of subsidized reinsurance program, 
including so-called “invisible high risk pools.”2 
The House’s American Health Care Act, the 
Senate’s Better Care Reconciliation Act, and 
several state waiver requests under Section 
1332 of the ACA all include subsidized 
reinsurance provisions.3 Subsidized reinsurance 
combines significant external subsidies to the 
individual market with some degree of risk 
spreading through reinsurance. It contrasts with 
commercial reinsurance arrangements (and 
certain government authorized or mandated 
reinsurance programs), which spread risk 
among and between insurers without an 
external subsidy, and with possible direct 
subsidization of the individual market without 
reinsurance. 
Traditional high risk pools operated in most 
states before 2014, when insurers could 
underwrite and price coverage based on health 
status. People unable to obtain coverage due 
to pre-existing  conditions could do so in a 
separate risk pool, typically at higher than 
“standard” but subsidized premium rates, thus 
insulating the underwritten market from the 
cost of insuring these high risks.4 Under the 
ACA’s current structure, some form of supply-
side subsidy to the individual market could 
serve a similar role, lowering premiums and 
increasing take up of coverage by younger/
healthier enrollees, thus putting further 
downward pressure on premiums. 
This issue brief describes alternative forms 
of subsidized reinsurance to help stabilize 
individual health insurance, and compares 
them with possible direct subsidies of 
individual market enrollment. It summarizes 
specific state initiatives and Congressional 
proposals that include subsidized reinsurance 
programs. Assuming a comparable amount 
of external funding, it then discusses the 
potential effects of alternative approaches 
on insurers’ risk and risk margins in premiums; 
incentives for risk selection; incentives for care 
management, coordination, and cost control; 
and the costs and complexity of administration.
REINSURANCE AS A  
SUBSIDY MECHANISM
Under the ACA’s system of guaranteed issue 
and community rating, insurers price coverage 
based on average expected claim costs for 
the overall risk pool, with enrollee premiums 
tailored to age and type of plan. External 
funding through some form of reinsurance will 
reduce insurers’ average expected costs (net of 
the funding), with premium reductions spread 
broadly among enrollees. For a given amount 
of funding, a particular program’s effects will 
depend on its impact on the cost of coverage, 
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Subsidized reinsurance represents a potentially important tool to help stabilize individual health insurance markets. This brief describes 
alternative forms of subsidized reinsurance and the mechanisms by which they spread risk and reduce premiums. It summarizes specific 
state initiatives and Congressional proposals that include subsidized reinsurance. It compares approaches to each other and to more 
direct subsidies of individual market enrollment. For a given amount of funding, a particular program’s efficacy will depend on how it 
affects insurers’ risk and the risk margins built into premiums, incentives for selecting or avoiding risks, incentives for coordinating and 
managing care, and the costs and complexity of administration. These effects warrant careful consideration by policymakers as they 
consider measures to achieve stability in the individual market in the long term.
and the ability of lower premiums to attract a 
healthier mix of enrollees and expand overall 
enrollment to help achieve economies of scale 
in non-claim costs. 
Table 1 summarizes key features of three 
approaches to providing subsidized reinsurance, 
along with the alternative of providing direct 
per enrollee subsidies.
Per enrollee reinsurance (also known as 
“stop loss” or “specific excess” reinsurance), 
reimburses a percentage of an enrollee’s 
annual claim costs between a threshold and 
a maximum claim amount. It was used in the 
ACA’s transitional reinsurance program during 
2014-16 and remains a part of Medicare Part D.5
Invisible high risk pools (a form of condition-
based reinsurance) reimburse a percentage of 
claims above a threshold for all enrollees with 
specified health conditions. Programs may also 
give insurers the discretion to enroll others 
based on enrollee health status statements. 
Aggregate coinsurance (also known 
as “quota share” reinsurance) simply 
reimburses a percentage of all claims during 
a year, regardless of size or underlying health 
condition. It is roughly analogous to federal-
state sharing of costs under Medicaid, and to 
overall federal funding of Medicare Part D. 
A per enrollee subsidy pays a specified 
flat amount per enrollee per month or year. 
It is analogous to basic federal payments 
(before risk adjustment) to support Medicare 
Advantage, and to per capita allotment 
proposals for federal Medicaid funding. 
Potential external funding sources include 
federal or state government funds, assessments 
on insured and self-insured plan enrollees, and 
assessments on providers. Any assessments 
linked to the individual market or requiring 
individual market insurers to pay for reinsurance 
would reduce the impact on premiums. To the 
extent that external funding reduces premiums 
in general and specifically for second lowest 
cost Silver plans, federal APTCs will decline, 
thus reducing or possibly eliminating the net 
cost of additional funding. Such “pass through 
funding” based on projected federal savings 
from lower APTCs has been integral to 
reinsurance proposals in Section 1332 waiver 
applications.6
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TABLE 1.   
Subsidized Reinsurance and Direct Subsidies
Mechanism Description Examples / similar mechanisms
Per enrollee reinsurance Reimburses percentage of enrollee 
annual claims between a threshold and 
cap; insurer may pay a fee towards 
cost of program
Medicare Part D catastrophe 
reinsurance; ACA transitional 
reinsurance; Minnesota Section 1332 
waiver request
Invisible high risk pool (condition-
specific reinsurance)
Reimburses percentage of enrollee 
annual claims above a threshold for  
enrollees with specified conditions; 
may permit reinsurance of other 
enrollees at insurer’s discretion; insurer 
pays part or all of enrollee premium 
Maine 2012-2013; Alaska 2017 and 
Section 1332 approved waiver 2018; 
American Health Care Act (H.R. 
1628)
Aggregate coinsurance Reimburses percentage of all claims 
during year
Federal matching rates for Medicaid; 
combined federal funding of direct 
subsidy and reinsurance for Medicare 
Part D
Per enrollee subsidy Pays flat amount per enrollee per 
month 
Basic Medicare Advantage payment 
(before risk adjustment)
TABLE 2.   
Subsidized Per Enrollee Reinsurance Programs
Plan Coverage Funding
Medicare Part D reinsurance Federal government pays 80% of 
annual enrollee spending above 
catastrophic threshold (plan 15%, 
enrollee 5%)
Federal reinsurance payments and 
direct subsidy fund 74.5% of total plan 
costs (more for low income enrollees)
ACA transitional reinsurance 2014: 100% of claims between $45,000 
and $250,000
2015: 55% of claims between $45,000 
and $250,000
2016: projected 53% of claims between 
$90,000 and $250,000 
Assessments for all individual, group, 
and self-insured enrollees ($63 
PMPM in 2014, $44 in 2015, $27 in 
2016)
American Health Care Act (H.R. 1628) Patient and State Stability Fund 
includes default federal reinsurance 
program to reimburse 75% of annual 
claims for an enrollee between 
$50,000 and $350,000 
$100 billion 2018-2026 for default 
federal reinsurance or alternative state 
grants; state matching of 10% in 2020 
growing to 50% in 2024 for default 
reinsurance (7% in 2020 to 50% in 
2026 for alternative programs)
Better Care Reconciliation Act (Senate 
alternative to H.R. 1628)
State Stability and Innovation Program 
includes short-term funding for 
reinsurance program during 2018-
2021 (details determined by HHS 
Secretary), and separate long-term 
funding for 2019-2026 that can include 
reinsurance 
$50 billion for short-term program 
reinsurance with no state match; $132 
billion for long-term program, which 
can include reinsurance, with state 
match of 7% in 2022 growing to 35% 
in 2026 
Individual Health Insurance 
Marketplace Improvement Act (S. 
1354)
80% of annual claims for an enrollee 
between $50,000 ($100,000 
beginning in 2021) and $500,000 
(amounts indexed for increase in 
average premiums after 2018) 
All funding necessary to carry out the 
program
Minnesota Premium Security Plan 
(pending Section 1332 waiver request)
80% of annual claims for an enrollee 
between $50,000 and $250,000 in 
2018; 50-80% of claims between 
$50,000 or more and $250,000 or less 
after 2018
$271 million in funding in 2018 with 
projected APTC and Basic Health 
Plan pass through funding of $139 
million - $167 million and state 
funding of the remainder
Iowa’s Proposed Stopgap Measure 
(pending)
85% of claims between $100,000 and 
$3 million and 100% of claims above $3 
million (60% of claims above $1 million 
covered by Federal High-Cost Risk 
Pooling Program)
Projected cost of $80 million in 2018 
funded by APTC and reduced Cost 
Sharing Reduction pass through
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PER ENROLLEE REINSURANCE
Table 2 provides a more detailed summary of 
subsidized per enrollee reinsurance programs.7 
This approach has been used to partially 
subsidize “catastrophic” claims under Medicare 
Part D since its inception. As implemented, 
the ACA’s transitional reinsurance program 
reimbursed 100% of enrollee claims in a year 
between $45,000 and $250,000 for 2014, 55.1% 
of claims between $45,000 and $250,000 for 
2015, and a projected 52.9% of claims between 
$90,000 and $250,000 for 2016. The program 
was funded by assessments for all individual, 
group, and self-insured enrollees, thus providing 
a net subsidy to the individual market, which is 
believed to have lowered premiums by 10%-15% 
in 2014 and declined over time. 
The American Health Care Act (H.R. 1628) 
passed by the House in May would provide 
substantial federal funding for a Patient and 
State Stability Fund during 2018-2026, with 
required state matching of funding beginning 
in 2020. While states could design alternative 
programs, the default stabilization program was 
per enrollee reinsurance, which would reimburse 
75% of an enrollee’s annual claim costs between 
$50,000 and $350,000. The Senate Republican 
substitute bill, the Better Care Reconciliation 
Act, included substantial funding for a short-
term reinsurance program during 2018-2021 
with no state matching required and with 
program details to be determined by the HHS 
Secretary. It included additional long-term 
funding for state programs that could include 
reinsurance, with some state funding eventually 
required. 
On the Democrat side, Senators Carper, 
Kaine, and others introduced the Individual 
Health Marketplace Improvement Act (S. 
1354) to establish federally funded per enrollee 
reinsurance that in 2018 would reimburse 
80% of an enrollee’s annual claims between 
$50,000 ($100,000 in 2021) and $500,000. 
The thresholds would be indexed to growth in 
average premiums after 2018. The bill does not 
specify the amount of funding but indicates 
that all necessary funding will be provided to 
carry out the program.
At the state level, and in the face of large 
premium increases and declining enrollment, 
Minnesota used more than $300 million in 
emergency funding to provide 25% premium 
rebates to non-APTC eligible individual market 
enrollees for 2017. It subsequently applied for 
a Section 1332 waiver (pending) to establish 
the Minnesota Premium Security Plan.8 This 
reinsurance plan would reimburse 80% of an 
enrollee’s annual claims between $50,000 and 
$250,000 in 2018, with possible changes in 
the sharing percentage and thresholds after 
2018. (The state’s application also indicates 
that it will “strongly consider moving to a 
conditions-based model” beginning in 2019.) 
The projected required funding of $271 million 
in 2018, projected to reduce premiums by 
20%, includes estimated pass through savings 
of $139 million to $167 million from reduced 
federal APTCs and reduced federal funding of 
Minnesota’s Basic Health Plan, with the state 
funding the remainder. 
Facing large premium increases and the 
possibility of not having any Marketplace 
insurers in 2018, Iowa applied to HHS for 
emergency funding in June to stabilize its 
individual market.9 The state’s Proposed 
Stopgap Measure would reimburse 85% of 
annual enrollee claims between $100,000 and 
$3 million and 100% of claims above $3 million. 
Sixty percent of the reimbursement for claims 
above $1 million would come from the Federal 
High-Cost Risk Pooling Program (see note 7). 
The application projects that an additional cost 
of $80 million in 2018 can be funded primarily 
by reduced federal APTCs. 
INVISIBLE HIGH RISK POOLS
Table 3 provides additional details on invisible 
high risk pools in Maine, Alaska, and the 
proposed American Health Care Act.10 
Facing large premium increases and declining 
insurer participation in its individual market 
with guaranteed issue and age-adjusted 
community rating, in 2011 Maine established 
the Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance 
Association (MGARA) as an invisible high 
TABLE 3.   
Subsidized Invisible High Risk Pool Programs
Maine Alaska AHCA proposed amendment (Palmer) AHCA adopted amendment
Entity Maine Guaranteed Access 
Reinsurance Association
Alaska Reinsurance Program Federal Invisible High Risk Pool Federal Invisible Risk Sharing 
Program
Effective July 1, 2012 – December 31, 2013 January 1, 2017; Section 1332 waiver 
January 1, 2018
January 1, 2018 January 1, 2018
Mandatory reinsurance 8 health conditions at time of issue 33 health conditions at issue or during year 8 health conditions at issue plus any 
others designated by HHS Secretary
Determined by HHS Secretary
Voluntary reinsurance Permitted at issue Not permitted Permitted at issue Determined by HHS Secretary 
Reimbursement 90% of amount above $7,500 up 
to $32,500; 100% above $32,500
100% 100% of claims above $10,000; 
providers reimbursed at Medicare rates 
Determined by HHS Secretary 
Reinsurance premium 90% of enrollee premium 100% of enrollee premium 90% of enrollee premium Determined by HHS Secretary
Other funding $4 PMPM for individual and 
group insurance and third-party 
administered self-insured plans
$55 million from general state premium 
taxes in 2017; projected $52 million in 
APTC pass through funding in 2018
No provision $15 billion from Treasury during 
2018-2026
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risk pool. MGARA operated from July 1, 2012 
until the ACA’s transitional reinsurance began 
on January 1, 2014.11 Insurers had to reinsure 
(“cede”) all enrollees with one or more of 
eight health conditions at the time coverage 
was issued. Insurers could also voluntarily 
cede enrollees based on an enrollee health 
statement. MGARA reimbursed 90% of a 
reinsured enrollee’s annual claims between 
$7,500 and $32,500 and 100% of claims above 
$32,500. To fund the program, insurers had 
to cede 90% of the premium for reinsured 
enrollees, and all individual, group, and third-
party administered self-insured health plans 
were assessed $4 per member per month. 
The Maine program’s impact on premiums 
and coverage take up is uncertain.12 While 
the state’s largest insurer estimated that 
MGARA accounted for a 20% rate reduction, 
its adoption coincided with expansion of the 
state’s age rating band and changes in required 
benefits and allowed cost sharing. Previous 
enrollees were allowed to retain coverage at the 
old rating rules, thus resulting in old and new 
risk pools, with younger enrollees more likely to 
migrate to the new rules and pool. 
Under the Alaska Reinsurance Program, 
which took effect January 1, 2017, insurers 
had to reinsure enrollees with one or more of 
33 health conditions at issue or if diagnosed 
during the plan year. Unlike Maine, insurers 
could not voluntarily reinsure other enrollees. 
The program reimbursed 100% of all claims for 
reinsured enrollees during the plan year; insurers 
had to cede 100% of the premiums. The 
program was funded in 2017 with $55 million 
from general state premium taxes. Alaska 
subsequently received a Section 1332 waiver 
in July to continue the program in 2018. The 
waiver application projects that lower premiums 
will allow the program to be funded with $52 
million in APTC pass through savings in 2018.13 
An amendment to the American Health Care 
Act proposed by Representative Palmer 
in March would have established a Federal 
Invisible High Risk Pool (FIHRP) patterned 
after the Maine program. Insurers would cede 
enrollees with one or more of eight health 
conditions (or additional conditions specified by 
the HHS Secretary) and could voluntary cede 
other enrollees based on a health statement. 
Annual claims above $10,000 would be fully 
reimbursed. Distinctively, providers would 
be reimbursed for claims above this amount 
at Medicare rates (which, according to one 
actuarial study, would have a major impact on 
the proposal’s ability to reduce premiums).14 
Insurers would cede 90% of premiums for 
reinsured enrollees, subject to a possible 
adjustment based on cost control mechanisms. 
No specific funding was proposed. The revised 
amendment ultimately included in the bill would 
simply have established a Federal Invisible Risk 
Sharing Program with all program details to 
be determined by the HHS Secretary and $15 
billion in funding during 2018-2026.
COMPARISON
With external funding, all these approaches 
have the potential to lower insurers’ average 
costs net of the subsidy, lowering required 
premiums, encouraging greater and more 
balanced take up of coverage, and thus 
contributing to even lower costs and premiums. 
However, they do so in different ways. For 
example, by requiring insurers to cede most 
of the premiums for reinsured enrollees, 
an invisible high risk pool is likely to permit 
significantly greater reimbursement than 
per enrollee reinsurance, while aggregate 
coinsurance and per enrollee subsidies will 
likely fund relatively modest amounts of total 
claim costs. Hence, per enrollee reinsurance 
can provide significant reimbursement of large 
claims regardless of cause, invisible high risk 
pools can provide substantial reimbursement 
of claims at much lower thresholds for 
enrollees with some conditions, and aggregate 
coinsurance can provide relatively small 
reimbursement of all claims. 
Given this context, Table 4 provides a 
qualitative and subjective comparison of the 
alternatives’ potential effects on insurers’ 
risk and risk margins in premiums, insurers’ 
incentives, and program administrative costs 
and complexity. The focus is on their relative 
strengths and weaknesses as stabilization 
mechanisms in a general environment of 
guaranteed issue, age-adjusted community 
rating, and risk adjustment. Political 
considerations or interactions with other 
potential changes to the ACA are not 
considered. 
Insurers’ risk and premiums. Insurers face 
two broad types of risk that affect premiums: 
1) random (idiosyncratic) variation in the 
frequency and severity of claims, and 2) 
pricing risk that arises because insurers need to 
forecast trends in medical costs 6-18 months or 
longer in the future. Idiosyncratic risk generally 
declines as an insurer covers more enrollees in 
given market or diversifies across geographic 
regions and types of coverage. Commercial 
reinsurance can also be purchased. In contrast, 
TABLE 4.   
Comparison of Subsidy Approaches
Per enrollee 
reinsurance 
Invisible high 
risk pool 
Aggregate 
coinsurance
Per enrollee 
subsidy
Reduces idiosyncratic risk (random 
variation in costly claims) 
Reduces pricing risk (imprecise 
forecasts of medical cost trends)
Reduces incentives  
for risk selection 
Maintains incentives for care 
management, coordination,  
and cost control
Minimizes administrative cost  
and complexity 
Note: Greater shading indicates greater potential effectiveness.
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pricing or trend risk cannot be reduced simply 
by selling more coverage in a given market, 
but can be reduced by diversification across 
markets. Actuarial and economic models 
of insurance pricing imply that greater risk 
requires insurers to include larger risk margins in 
premiums. In addition to the direct impact of an 
external subsidy, reinsurance approaches may 
further reduce premiums by reducing insurers’ 
risk, although it may crowd out commercial 
reinsurance. 
Per enrollee reinsurance will likely have the 
largest impact on insurers’ idiosyncratic risk 
by providing substantial reimbursement of 
relatively large claims regardless of cause. 
Capping reimbursement for very large claims 
helps preserve incentives for purchasing 
commercial reinsurance. In contrast, invisible 
high risk pools reimburse more frequent, 
relatively modest, and less risky claims 
associated with chronic conditions, and 
they substantially eliminate incentives to 
purchase commercial reinsurance for reinsured 
enrollees. At the same time, they provide no 
reimbursement for large idiosyncratic claims 
for other enrollees. By reinsuring only a small 
percentage of total claim costs, aggregate 
coinsurance will have relatively little impact 
on idiosyncratic risk. Likewise, per enrollee 
subsidies will have little or no impact.
Each approach could reduce trend risk if the 
subsidy adjusts over time to reflect overall 
growth in claims costs or premiums, but the 
magnitude would likely be modest. Invisible 
high risk pools could have some advantage if 
trend risk is above average for the specified 
health conditions (for example, due to 
unanticipated increases in the number of 
enrollees with those conditions, or introduction 
of new and expensive treatments). 
Incentives for risk selection. The ACA’s 
permanent risk adjustment program reduces 
insurers’ incentives to avoid sicker-than-average 
enrollees (risk selection) and the financial risk of 
attracting a disproportionate number of such 
enrollees (adverse selection). However, risk 
adjustment is inherently imperfect and does not 
eliminate these incentives and risks. 
Per enrollee reinsurance can further reduce 
these risks by partially reimbursing relatively 
large claims not fully predicted by the risk 
adjustment model. Aggregate coinsurance with 
percentage reimbursement will have relatively 
little impact. Per enrollee subsidies will have 
no effect unless the subsidy amounts are risk 
adjusted, as is done for Medicare Advantage, 
and which presumably would replace the 
current risk adjustment program. 
Mandatory reinsurance of claim costs for 
enrollees with specified conditions under an 
invisible high risk pool would reduce selection 
incentives and reduce the need for risk 
adjustment for those conditions.15 It would 
require significant coordination with the risk 
adjustment program to reduce overlap and 
redundancy. Permitting insurers to cede 
enrollees voluntarily based on information 
provided in a health statement could 
supplement existing risk adjustment, if it targets 
enrollees that are likely to have higher costs 
than predicted by the risk adjustment model. 
An ability to reinsure those enrollees voluntarily 
would reduce incentives to avoid enrolling them 
in the first place.  
Incentives for care management, 
coordination, and cost control. Any 
stabilization program that reimburses a portion 
of an insurer’s claim costs could reduce its 
incentives for care management, coordination, 
and cost control. Per enrollee subsidies have 
a clear advantage on this dimension. The 
disincentive effects of aggregate coinsurance 
could be modest assuming that the percentage 
of claims reimbursed is small, but aggregate 
coinsurance would affect incentives for all 
claims. Per enrollee reinsurance would affect 
incentives for relatively large claims up to the 
cap, but many of these claims involve acute 
injuries or illness for which care management, 
coordination, and cost control could be less 
important.
Invisible high risk pools fare poorly on this 
dimension. Substantial reimbursement of 
claims for enrollees with specified chronic 
conditions (or for enrollees voluntarily reinsured 
based on health statements) risks significantly 
undermining insurers’ incentives for care 
management, coordination, and cost control, 
perhaps including incentives to negotiate 
favorable terms with providers. This could 
require extensive auditing, care protocols, or 
other specialized programs to mitigate the 
resulting disincentives. 
Requiring that providers be reimbursed at 
Medicare rates, as proposed in the original 
Palmer amendment, essentially requires 
participating providers to help finance the 
subsidy to the individual market. In addition 
to the question of how such an arrangement 
would be administered, it would significantly 
disrupt insurer-provider contracting, possibly 
reducing the willingness of providers to contract 
with individual market plans. It could also 
exert upward pressure on negotiated prices 
for services not subject to reimbursement 
at Medicare rates, increasing insurers’ costs 
for those services, and thus reducing the 
program’s ability to lower premiums and expand 
enrollment.
Administrative costs and complexity. 
All approaches have administrative and 
compliance costs. Greater complexity will 
produce higher costs and increase the potential 
for unintended consequences (including 
gaming and opportunism over time). Per 
enrollee reinsurance has a simple structure with 
relatively straightforward administration and 
compliance, with substantial prior experience 
under the ACA’s transitional reinsurance 
program. Aggregate coinsurance has a simple 
structure with similar administrative and 
compliance issues. Invisible high risk pools are 
considerably more complex in structure, which 
would increase administrative and compliance 
costs. The administration and complexity of 
per enrollee subsidies would depend on how 
the amount of subsidy was determined and 
updated over time. 
CONCLUSION
Subsidized reinsurance represents a potentially 
important tool to help stabilize individual health 
insurance markets. External funding through 
some form of reinsurance would reduce 
insurers’ average expected costs net of the 
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funding, lowering premiums and making coverage more affordable for people eligible for little or 
no premium subsidy. Enrollment by younger/healthier enrollees would increase, putting further 
downward pressure on premiums. Lower premiums would reduce premium subsidies under 
current law, reducing the need for additional funding. For a given amount of funding, a particular 
program’s efficacy will depend on how it affects insurers’ risk and risk margins in premiums; 
incentives for risk selection; incentives for care management, coordination, and cost control; 
and the costs and complexity of administration. These effects warrant careful consideration by 
policymakers and additional analysis. 
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